South Carolina Law Review
Volume 65

Issue 2

Article 5

Winter 2013

In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in the Wake
of Disaster
Matthew Paul Crouch

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Crouch, Matthew Paul (2013) "In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in the Wake of
Disaster," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 65 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Crouch: In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in the Wake

IN THE AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND
PROFESSIONALISM IN THE WAKE OF DISASTER

Matthew Paul Crouch*
I.

INTRODUCTION

II. DEFINING DISASTER

.....................................
................................

...... 465
....... 468

III. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE MODEL RULES, AND NEGLIGENCE..469
A. Duties to Clients
.................................
..... 470
B. Death or Disabilityof the Attorney.
..................
....... 475
C. Negligence Analysis and Emergency Plans..............
..... 476
IV. EMERGENCY PLANS AND THEIR USE BY THE LEGAL PROFESSION ............. 478

................................. 481
Changes to Pro Bono Model Rules Post-Katrina.........
......... 484

V. PRO BONO IN TIMES OF DISASTER

A.

VI. PROFESSIONALISM, THE RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE AFTER DISASTERS
...........................
..
......... 487

A.

Statutes of Limitations, Civility, and Equity from Courts and
..... 489
................................
Opposing Counsel.
B. The Rule ofLaw Meets "KatrinaTime...
..........................493
C. InternationalLaw and the Right to Return ............
....... 496
D. Post-DisasterSocial Justice
........................
...... 498

VII. CONCLUSION

I.

...........................................

.......

501

INTRODUCTION

In the flooding that resulted from Hurricane Katrina, over 50% of
Louisiana's practicing attorneys lost their offices, their homes, or both. In
Mississippi, the offices of nearly 900 attorneys along the Gulf Coast were

. Attorney licensed in Colorado, Texas, and as a solicitor of England and Wales
(nonpractising). Special thanks to Annai Escobedo and Adrian Leal for their assistance. I am grateful to

Professor Edward Roche, Chris Antcliff, Richard Poorman, Patricia Spence, and Linda Young for
their extremely helpful comments on previous drafts. I am appreciative of the American Inns of
Court, to the editors of the South CarolinaLaw Review, and readers. I must acknowledge and thank
the superlative wisdom, patience, and wit of Jeny Crouch, without whom this would never have
been written. The American Inns of Court selected this Essay as the winner of the 2013 Warren E.
Burger Prize, for which the Author was recognized at the 2013 American Inns of Court Celebration
of Excellence, held at the Supreme Court of the United States in Washington, DC, on October 19,
2013.
1.

Michael J. Vitt, After the Storm: Gulf CoastLawyers Rebuild, BENCH & B. MINN., Mar.

2006, at 22, 23.
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severely damaged or destroyed by Katrina.2 Over 1,400 attorneys in the World
Trade Center buildings lost their offices and records as a result of the September
11 attacks. 3 An EF-5 tornado hit the town of Joplin, Missouri, on May 22,
2011,4 substantially damaging or destroying the offices of several local
attorneys.s A downtown office building in Madison, Wisconsin caught fire on
April 24, 2012, causing an estimated $2 million in damages and destroying
multiple law offices.6 A solo practitioner was diagnosed with cancer, and after
realizing that it would result in her death, turned her practice and cases over to a
colleague-including numerous bankruptcy cases in various stages of
emergency. Backup billing records for a law office were destroyed by a
8
computer virus. Disasters are not limited by geography, history, and action-or
9
lack thereof. Any disaster-no matter if it is a hurricane or a tornado affecting
thousands, a fire destroying a solo practitioner's office, or even the sudden death
or disability of an attorney-has the potential to wreak havoc on attorneys and
law firms, their practices, and their clients. 10 More so, disasters cause turmoil
and uncertainty in the operation and application of the rule of law.11
While the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules) set forth the regulations under which attorneys
practice, these rules do not excuse failures to comply based on the occurrence
of a disaster.13 With knowledge that a disaster could occur, attorneys are
potentially subject to ethical violations and legal malpractice claims if they fail

2.

Keith B. Norman, Hurricane Katrina and the Practice of Law, 66 ALA. L. 416, 416

(2005).
3. Judge Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of the State of N.Y. & Chief Judge of the N.Y. Court
of Appeals, Enduring Values and Changing Times, Orison S. Marden Memorial Lecture Before the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Mar. 5, 2002), in 57 THE RECORD,
WINTER/SPRING 2002, at 20, 22, available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/record/17.%/20
Vol./o2057,%/2ONos.%/201-2,%/20Winter-Spring%202002.pdf.
4.

Bill Davis, Joplin Tornado Survey, NAT'L WEATHER SERV. WEATHER FORECAST OFF.

(May 22, 2011), http://www.crh.noaa.gov/sgf/?n-event 201 1may22 survey.
5.

See Cynthia K. Heerboth, Disaster Recovery: Is Your Firm Prepared?, PRECEDENT,

Summer 2011, at 6, 7.
6.

Thomas J. Watson, Up in Smoke: Preparea Disaster-Recovery Plan Before Disaster

Strikes, WIs. L., July 2012, at 34, 34.
7.
Susan A. Berson, Death ofa Practice:As a Lawyer Nears the End, Her FriendFaces the
Dilemma of ClosingDown a Firm, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2013, at 42, 43.

8.

In re Ward, 701 N.W.2d 873, 877 (N.D. 2005).

9.

See Jean Barr, Putting Together a Disaster Recovery Plan, LEGAL MGMT., Jan./Feb.

1993, at 30, 31.
10. See Heerboth, supra note 5, at 7.
11.

See generallyRonald A. Cass, The Rule ofLaw in Time ofCrisis,51 How. L.J. 653, 672-

76 (2008) (discussing the implications of the rule of law during disasters).
12. See Robert W. Meserve, Chair'sIntroduction to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, at

xv, xvii (2013).
13.

Stephen N. Zack, Forewordto AM.BAR.ASS'N. SPECIAL COMM. ON DISASTER RESPONSE

& PREPAREDNESS, SURVIVING A DISASTER: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DISASTER PLANNING (Aug.

2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/disaster/surviving_a
disaster a lawyersguide to disasterplanning.authcheckdam.pdf.
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to plan for such an event.14 The case law on this topic ranges from courts
recognizing that certain things are out of an attorney's hands15 to courts noting
that a disaster is no excuse for failure to comply with orders or rules.16 This
Essay recommends that attorneys and firms should assess risks attendant to
disasters and properly plan for them.
Beyond mitigating these ethical risks, attorneys must be willing to take on
some of the greater challenges that arise from disasters.17 The legal profession is
progressing in its response to disasters, as well as their related effects, beginning
with the recognition that "[t]he legal system plays a central role in disaster
prevention, response, and management."18 Yet in many situations, the legal
profession has failed to protect the rights of groups and individuals or failed to
offer pro bono legal services in truly meaningful ways to those affected by
disaster. 19 This Essay recommends that, in both pre-disaster planning and postdisaster settings, an aware and proactive legal profession be required to ensure
that the principles of professionalism and justice are upheld.
Part II of this Essay briefly discusses the definition and scope of the term
disaster,with an emphasis on how it is applicable to the legal profession. Part
III examines the ethical rules for attorneys relating to disasters, including the
requirements under the Model Rules and the potential liability of an attorney
through a professional negligence-based analysis. Part IV provides an overview
of strategies that attorneys and firms should implement-specifically, the need
for emergency action plans. Part V discusses pro bono work following disasters
and changes made to the Model Rules to aid this work, including consideration
of and counterpoints to rationales often used in limiting pro bono service. Part VI
considers the role of professionalism and social justice applicable to actions
taken by attorneys in the wake of disaster. This Part includes a brief discussion
of a principle of international law that becomes relevant following a disaster, as
well as the broader obligations that may be applicable to the legal profession. In
Part VI, this Essay posits that these obligations require a stronger response from
the legal profession, and that it is incumbent upon the members of this profession

14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Coleman v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., NV, 887 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.R.I. 1995)
(holding that a trial court properly tolled the statute of limitations where counsel's files were
destroyed in a fire); 3M Co. v. Glass, 917 So. 2d 90, 94 (Miss. 2005) (noting that Hurricane Katrina
was a sufficient reason to extend the time for counsel to provide required information).
16. See, e.g., Matajek v. Skowronska, 893 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
that it was not excusable for counsel to file a mediation questionnaire two months late due to
hurricanes).
17. See generallyLaurie A. Morin, A Tale of Two Cities: Lessons Learnedfrom New Orleans
to the District of Columbiafor the Protection of Vulnerable Populationsfrom the Consequences of

Disaster, 12 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 45 (2009) (assembling a catalog of lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina regarding challenges the legal profession faces when a disaster strikes).
18.

Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection of Environmental

Law andDisasterLaw, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1787 (2011).
19. See Deborah Rhode, Pro Bono in Times of Crisis;Looking Forwardby Looking Back, 31
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1011, 1011-18 (2004).
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to remember that a response-good or bad-affects the broader populace in
ways many attorneys may not have considered.
II. DEFINING DISASTER

The first step in disaster planning, of course, involves predicting the type of
disaster an attorney or firm may face.20 Obviously, attorneys must plan for the
possibility of a large natural disaster, such as a hurricane, tornado, or flood.2 1
But many events that are not disasters for the community at large can be
disasters for an attorney,22 such as the sudden death or disability of a key
25
24
individual to a firm, 23 disbarment or suspension, an office fire, workplace
violence,26 acts of terrorism,27 an accidental deletion of computer files,28 or even
simply spilling coffee on an office computer.2 9
This step should be followed by an analysis of vulnerability: attorneys and
firms must assess the resources they have in place should a disaster strike,
recognizing that lack of resources results in increased vulnerability to clients, as
well as to the firm or attorney.30 Attorneys and firms must then periodically
evaluate and update emergency plans and required resources in accordance with
lessons learned from others and, perhaps, even their own experiences with
disaster.31

20.

Laura DiBiase, When DisasterStrikes-Strike Back!, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2003, at

14, 14.
21.

See id.

22 One practical definition of disaster applicable to the legal profession is "[a] true disaster
is an event or circumstance that can drive the firm [or an attorney] out of business." Edward Poll,
Not if

but

When:

Prepare a Disaster Recovery Plan Today, CANADIAN

B. Ass'N,

http://www.cba.org/cba/practicelink/mf/disaster.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). According to
Professor Glesner, "sound law practice management will anticipate even earthquakes, floods and the
death of attorneys." Barbara A. Glesner, The Ethics of Emergency Lawyering, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 317, 322 (1991).
23. Laura A. Calloway, Preparingfor the Unexpected: Anticipate and Planfor Law Office
Disasters, 67 ALA. LAW., July 2006, at 254, 254; Ellen Freedman, Preparingfor and Recovering
from ... Disaster,PA. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 44, 45; Heerboth, supra note 5, at 7; see also Denis
Binder, Emergency Action Plans: A Legal and PracticalBlueprint "Failingto Plan is Planningto

Fail,"63
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

U. PITT. L. REv 791, 792 (2002) (providing a list of types of disasters and accidents).
Calloway, supra note 23, at 254.
Watson, supra note 6, at 34.
Freedman, supra note 23, at 45.
Id.
Id.

29. Heerboth, supra note 5, at 7.
30. Vulnerability is aptly defined as "the diminished capacity of an individual or group to
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural or man-made hazard"; this
concept is relative, dynamic, and varied in its forms. What is Vulnerability?, INT'L FED'N OF RED
CROSS & RED CRESCENT Soc'Ys, http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-

disasters/what-is-a-disaster/what-is-vulnerability/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
31. Binder, supra note 23, at 804.
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III. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY, THE MODEL RULES, AND NEGLIGENCE

Attorneys must be aware of the risks posed by disasters. Yet many attorneys
and firms fail to take basic steps to build the "capacity" 32 necessary to ensure
that ethical and business risks, such as loss of client property or accidental
exposure of client information, can be mitigated when a disaster occurs. 33 Some
of the excuses used to avoid undertaking emergency planning include claims that
it is "painful," time consuming, distracting, and results in lost profits and
decreased productivity. 34 Professor Munneke aptly describes the reasoning often
used to excuse failing to plan for disaster:
Despite the fact that disasters do happen, most of us live our daily
lives as if they will not happen to us. We do not plan for disaster,
especially when harm is less than certain. It is easier to rationalize that
we will "cross that bridge when we get to it" than to prepare for a risk
that may never come to pass. For many of us, the burden of taking
precautions is greater than the uncertain potential loss associated with a
disaster. As lawyers, we owe ourselves and our clients a responsibility
to be ready for the worst-case scenario. 35
The ABA recognized that the general failure to prepare for disasters "may
have devastating consequences on a lawyer/firm's survival .... [E]ven if the
disaster is small and contained, it may adversely affect a lawyer's ability to

diligently and competently represent a client and preserve the client's
,,36

In response to this concern, the ABA House of Delegates issued
property.
Resolution 116, which states: "[This Policy] urges all lawyers to regularly assess
their practice environment to identify and address risks that arise from any
natural or manmade disaster that may compromise their ability to diligently and

competently protect their clients' interests, and maintain the security of their
clients' property." 37
In explaining its reasoning for adopting this resolution, the ABA noted that
while the Model Rules are "neither excused nor waived following a disaster,"

32. Capacity refers to preparedness, which includes predicting and mitigating the effect of
disasters through continual processes of risk reduction. See Preparingfor Disasters,INT'L FED'N

OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT Soc'YS, http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disastermanagement/preparing-for-disaster/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
33. See Wayne J. Positan, The DayAfter Will be too Late, N.J. L., Feb. 2007, at 2.
34. James Keim, Law Office Disaster Preparedness: The Liability and Ethics of Attorneys,
FLA. B.J., May 2006, at 26, 26.
35. Gary A. Munneke, DisasterPlanning: What We Have (and Haven't) Learned, BUS. L.
TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 23, 23.
36. Am. Bar Ass'n, Res. 116 Adopted by the H.D., at 10 (Aug. 8-9, 2011), available at

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/201 1_am 116.authcheckdam.pdf.
37.

Id.
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they do not specifically address ethical obligations in such situations.38 Some
commentators suggest that, given the breadth and generality of the Rules, there
are times when an attorney's failure to prepare for a disaster could constitute an
ethical violation. 39
This Part examines a number of Model Rules and their state counterparts
that are, and have been, implicated by disaster. The terms legal ethics, ethics,
and professional responsibility are used interchangeably to describe the
requirements imposed on attorneys by disciplinary codes and rules.
A.

Duties to Clients

The preamble to the Model Rules provides that an attorney should be
"competent, prompt and diligent" in all professional functions.40 Yet apart from
its mention of the provision of legal services following a major disaster in Rule
5.5,41 the Model Rules do not specifically use the term disaster in their
application. Still, a number of the Model Rules are potentially implicated when
a disaster occurs.
For example, Rule 1.4 provides that attorneys must keep their clients
"reasonably informed," 42 and the comments to this Model Rule note that
reasonable communication is necessary for the client to effectively take part in
the representation.43 However, communication systems are often lost or
disrupted in the wake of a disaster. 44 Following the tornado in Joplin, two cell
phone towers collapsed onto an apartment building.45 Phone lines went down,
cell phone calls failed, and Internet access was disrupted. 46 In Katrina's
aftermath, damage to land telephone lines was so extensive that cell phone
communication became quickly overwhelmed and text messages failed.4 7
According to one attorney, evacuees from the New Orleans area bought new cell
phones with area codes for Baton Rouge, Lafayette, and Shreveport-jamming
cell phone lines in those localities as well. 48
An attorney seeking to comply with Model Rule 1.4 should maintain some
form of alternate communication or method of contacting clients in the event that

38. Id. at 2.
39. Sandra S. Varnado & Dane S. Ciolino, Reconsidering Lawyers' Ethical Obligations in
the Wake ofa Disaster, 19 PROF. L., no. 4, 2009 at 8, 13.
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 4 (2013).
41. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 14.
42. Id. R. 1.4(a)(3).
43. Id. R. 1.4 cmt. 1.
44. Press Release, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n & Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, FEMA &
FCC Unveil New Tip Sheet for Consumers on How to Communicate During Disasters (Sept. 21,
2001), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-309728Al.pdf.
45. See Davis, supra note, 4.
46. See Heerboth, supra note 5, at 11.
47. Glenn C. McGovern, Surviving Total Destruction of Your Law Office and Client Base
After a CatastrophicDisaster,41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 799, 802-03 (2006).
48. Id. at 803.
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the attorney or the attorney's clients are affected by a communication loss postdisaster. The national law firm of Adams and Reese had backup communication
technology, which greatly benefitted the firm in the period following Katrina.49
For example, intrafirm emails continued after the storm through an email system
via a third-party vendor, while members of the firm's mana ement team utilized
toll-free numbers to make daily reports at designated times.
An example of a failure to comply with this rule may be seen in In re DicksWoolridge. In that case, an attorney suffered from an office fire that destroyed
her computers and caused loss or damage to a number of client files. 52 The
attorney took no steps to reconstruct trust account records and failed to create a
new file for maintenance and management of a separate client's case and
documents.53 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a disciplinary panel's
findings that, inter alia,the failure to communicate with the client violated South
Carolina Rule 1.4.5
While the respondent attorney in Dicks- Woolridge did not indicate why she
made no attempt to contact her client, 5 she may have found the client's response
pleasantly surprising had she done so. In one case, in which a fire damaged a
building in downtown Madison, Wisconsin, affecting a number of attorneys who
had offices there, attorneys who made contacting clients a priority following the
56
fire were surprised by their clients' understanding.
Those attorneys lost no
clients.
Another area potentially impacted by disaster that is subject to provisions of
the Model Rules concerns the safekeeping of a client's property. Model Rule
1.15(a) requires an attorney to hold a client's property separate from the
attorney's property and to appropriately safeguard such property, in addition to
storing funds in a separate account. An attorney must promptly deliver to the
client funds or other property the client is entitled to receive, absent an
agreement or law to the contrary.59 Attorneys also must provide a full
accounting regarding such property if requested by the client.60 The comments
to Model Rule 1.15 establish the level of care an attorney should use in

49. Terry Carter, Riding out the Storm: Even the Best Disaster Plans Can't Help New
Orleans Lawyers Account for Lost Clients, Disruptionand Uncertainty,A.B.A. J., Feb. 2006, at 32,
36.
50. Id.
51. In re Dicks-Woolridge, 371 S.C. 42, 48, 637 S.E.2d 565, 568 (2006).
52. Id. at 46, 637 S.E.2d at 567.
53. Id. at 46-47, 49, 637 S.E.2d at 567, 569. The court noted that from the date of the office
fire, the respondent attorney failed to maintain client ledgers or an accounting journal and made no
attempt to reconstruct her financial records. Id. at 49-50, 637 S.E.2d at 568-69.
54. Id. at 51-52, 637 S.E.2d at 569-70.
55. See id. at 46-48, 637 S.E.2d at 567-68.
56. Watson, supra note 6, at 35-36.
57. Id. at 36.
58.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (2013).

59. Id. R. 1.15(d).
60. Id.
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safekeeping client property, stating that property held by an attorney should be
kept "with the care required of a professional fiduciary." 6 1 Some commentators
suggest that, to comply with this Model Rule, an attorney must make greater
efforts to protect client property than the attorney's own property.62 Some states
require similar levels of care for attorneys in their management of trust
accounts.63 Model Rule 1.16(d) provides that clients are entitled to have
property and papers returned to them when representation ceases.64 Neither
Model Rule 1.15 nor 1.16 provides an exception for disasters.
Returning to the Dicks-Woolridge case, the disciplinary panel found that the
failure to reconstruct even minimal documentation to determine the ownership of
trust account funds after the fire was a violation of South Carolina Rule 1.15,
though the panel considered the fire as a mitigating circumstance in its
analysis.65 A case from North Dakota, in which a computer virus destroyed an
attorney's billing records, provides a similar example. 66 The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the virus did not excuse the attorney's failure to
maintain duplicate billing records or account for fees advanced; the attorney
therefore violated North Dakota's Rule 1.15(f), which requires attorneys to keep
sufficient records to demonstrate compliance with the rule. 67 The North Dakota
Supreme Court's stance on the duty was clear: "Although it is unfortunate that a
computer virus destroyed [the attorney's] backup billing record files, it [did] not
relieve him of his duty to maintain records."68
Model Rule 1.6 requires an attorney to safeguard a client's confidential
information.69 The importance of client files and information was succinctly
stated by one of the attorneys affected by the fire in Madison, Wisconsin, who
said "[w]hat I really cared about was getting my client files back .... [A]t least
with our client files back, I could pretty much resume sleeping at night."70
The experiences from the Joplin tornado are instructive to the interpretation
of Model Rule 1.6 following a disaster. Missouri's Rules of Professional

61. Id. R. 1.15 cmt. 1. This is further supported by case law. See, e.g., Meyer v. Cathey, 167
S.W.3d 327, 330-31 (Tex. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 199
(Tex. 2002)) (noting that a fiduciary duty arises as a matter of law in attorney-client relationships).
62. See Varnado & Ciolino, supra note 39, at 15.
63.

See, e.g., R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 5-1.1(a) cmt. (2006) ("A lawyer must hold property

of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary.").
64.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2013).

65. In re Dicks-Woolridge, 371 S.C. 42, 51, 637 S.E.2d 565, 569 (2006).
66. In re Ward, 701 N.W.2d 873, 877 (N.D. 2005).
67.

Id. at 877-78 (citing N.D.R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.15(f) (2012)).

68. Id. at 877. A slightly similar situation was present in In re Acker, in which the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that an attorney's failure to turn over documents requested by the
Board of Grievances and the documents' eventual destruction in a hurricane constituted
noncompliance with the Board. 308 S.C. 338, 340-41, 417 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1992).
69.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013).

The Model Rules do not define

information or confidential information. See id. R. 1.0, 1.6.
70. Watson, supra note 6, at 35.
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Conduct contain restrictions common to most iterations of Rule 1.6.1 Following
the tornado, the president of the Jasper County Bar Association commented on
the wreckage of law offices and the exposure of client information, saying that
when "files [are] exposed and start blowing around, you've got confidential
information where it shouldn't be."72 One Joplin attorney said that he managed
to recover his computer's hard drive and about 70% of his active cases, but that
"one-of-a-kind documents" and his closed files were lost. 73
The State Bar of Michigan's Standing Commission on Professional and
Judicial Ethics issued an advisory ethics opinion discussing the duties of an
attorney when client files in that attorney's custody-subject to a retention plan
or retention period-are damaged by "fire, flood, or other circumstance beyond
the control of the lawyer." 74 The law firm discussed in the opinion suffered
serious water damage to client files after a fire in the firm's building rendered
files that had been closed for periods of six months to twenty years illegible,
absent an expensive restoration process.
The state bar noted that Michigan
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 (protection of the confidentiality of client
information), 1.15 (safekeeping client property), and Ethics Opinion R-5 (duty to
have a plan or procedure in place governing safekeeping and disposition of client
property) were all implicated in such a circumstance, 76 determining that "the
ethical principles must be interpreted pragmatically." 77 The state bar also
concluded that, absent a client's instructions to the contrary, if a client's rights
under a record retention policy have not expired, then the law firm has a duty to
make reasonable efforts to notify the affected clients of the damage and whether
the firm proposed destruction of the files. 7 8 In the event that the client fails to
respond or cannot be located, the file may be destroyed but only in a manner that
79
ensures the safety of the client confidences.
If an attorney is aware of a
specific circumstance that would require retention of a specific file, that file must
be preserved and restored at the attorney's expense, if necessary.s0
The ABA's Ethics 20/20 Commission proposed amending Model Rule 1.6
by adding a new paragraph providing that "[a] lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized

71. See Mo. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(a) (2007) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by Rule
4-1.6(b).").
72. Christine Simmons, 'One Day at a Time' in Joplin's Legal Community, Mo. LAWS.
WKLY., May 30, 2011, at 12.

73. Id.
74. State Bar Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof'1 & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-109, at 1 (1991),
available at 1991 WL 519883.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Id.
80. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

9

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
474

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 465

access to, information relating to the representation of a client."8 While the
Ethics 20/20 Commission's report on this proposed addition focused on
technology and associated risks,82 it is not unreasonable to think that this
requirement, if adopted, would be applicable to all forms of client information,
particularly in light of some of the examples discussed below. 83
Continuing advances in online data backup technology, such as cloud
technology, make both initial storage and backup of client data more accessible
in multiple circumstances. Certainly, cloud technologies have advantages, such
as portability and minimized vulnerability to disaster, that other systems-such
as backing up hard drives and physically taking them home nightly, using
magnetic tape, or using CD backups-do not. However, cloud computing
presents its own risks that must be accounted for in determining whether this is a
viable solution for law practices. 84 A proposed advisory opinion from the
Florida Bar Association noted that cloud computing "raises ethics concerns of
confidentiality, competence, and proper supervision of nonlawyers."
To
address these concerns, law practices would need to perform their due diligence
on cloud computing providers, which would include reviewin confidentiality
policies regarding disclosure of information stored in the cloud.

81. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Res. 105A, at 4 (Aug. 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics 2020/2012 hod annual meetin
g_105a filed may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
82. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, Rep. to H.D. 105A, at 10 (Aug. 2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/ethics 2020/2012 hod
annual meeting_105a filed may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.v.
83. An attorney's obligations are also subject to substantive and procedural laws, some of
which impose additional obligations on an attorney's duty to maintain confidentiality. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7 (2013). The Massachusetts laws regarding data

protection provide one example. See 201 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 17.01 to .05 (2009).
Massachusetts regulations require every person who "owns or licenses personal information" about
a Massachusetts resident to develop and implement a "comprehensive information security
program" to incorporate technological and physical safeguards, including encryption on laptops and
other portable devices. Id. §§ 17.03(1), 17.04(5). The phrase "owns or licenses" includes receiving,
storing, maintaining, or having access to "personal information," which consists of a resident's first
name or initial and last name, combined with one or more of the following: the resident's "(a)
Social Security number; (b) driver's license or state-issued identification card number; or (c)
financial account number, or credit or debit card number ..... Id. § 17.02. In comparison, the
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct are far less restrictive in regard to the scope of the
client information and property subject to protection. See MASS. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6,
1.15 (2013). Massachusetts Rule 1.6 refers only to "confidential information"; Rule 1.15 governs
trust accounts and "trust property"-including property held in a fiduciary capacity-and mandates
"appropriate safeguards," but it does not include property or documents received as investigatory
materials or as evidence. See id. R. 1.6(c); id. R. 1.15(a)(1), (b)(3). Certainly, Massachusetts
attorneys who collect credit card information when opening a client file could easily fall within the
scope of the more stringent state data protection laws and regulations.
84. These risks are numerous and could easily be the subject of a separate article.
85. Fla. Bar Prof'1 Ethics Comm., Op. 12-3 (2013), available at https://www.floridabar.org/
85256AA9005B9F25.nsf/0/9DA5423ABE78318685257B0100535ADD?OpenDocument.
86. Id.
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B. Death or Disabilityof the Attorney

The "ultimate disaster scenario" that requires pre-planning to ensure
compliance with the Model Rules is the death or disability of a solo
practitioner. 8 7 The comments to Model Rule 1.3-the rule covering attorney
diligence-clearly propose that creation of such a plan indicates compliance with
the rule. For example, a solo family law practitioner who dies suddenly can
leave behind several hundred open case files-many with looming deadlines-a
lease for a small office, and contracts with an online legal research and e-filing
provider personally guaranteed by the practitioner. A solo practitioner who
complied with Model Rule 1.3 might want another attorney-most likely
someone other than the executor handling the probate of the individual's
estate-to serve as a legal executor or designated successor. 89 A legal executor
might agree to take over management of cases upon the attorney's death or
disability and could be responsible for closing down the practice in the event of
the attorney's death.
Planning for these circumstances is just as relevant at small to mid-size
firms, particularly where senior partners-who possibly helped found the firms
themselves-are the substantial source of a firm's revenue.9o Large law firms
have an advantage over smaller firms in this regard, as they tend to be more
institutionalized regarding succession and replacement of partners and, given
their size, can more readily substitute new counsel in the event an attorney dies
or becomes disabled. 91
Certainly, client consent to such an arrangement is one of the many details
that attorneys would need to account for in such preparations.92 The ethical
obligations to plan for the death of an attorney are truly geared toward protecting
the needs of the client should such an event occur.93 Moreover, attorneys would

87. Am. Bar Ass'n, Res. 116 Adopted by the H.D., at 10 (Aug. 8-9, 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/201 1_am 116.authcheckdam.pdf.
88.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 5 (2013) ("To prevent neglect of client

matters in the event of a sole practitioner's death or disability, the duty of diligence may require that
each sole practitioner prepare a plan . .. that designates another competent lawyer to review client
files, notify each client of the lawyer's death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for
immediate protective action."). Many bar associations offer resources to encourage attorneys to
begin establishing such plans. See, e.g., MO. BAR, PLANNING AHEAD: A GUIDE TO PROTECT YOUR
CLIENT'S AND YOUR SURVIVOR'S INTERESTS IN THE EVENT OF YOUR DISABILITY OR DEATH 1

(2005), available at http://www.mobar.org/lpmonline/disaster/.
89. Utilizing a cross-agreement under which each attorney agrees to serve in this capacity for
the other may effectuate this result.
90.

See, e.g., Christine Simmons, Some Small, Mid-Sized Firms Begin Planning for

Succession, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202596807524&SomeSmallMidSized Firms Begin Planningfor Succe
ssion&slreturn=20130613174404#.
91. Id.; see also Traci M. Smith, Death of a Practice:Estate Planning With the Professional
Will, ARIz. ATT'Y, June 2007, at 36, 37-38.
92. See MO. BAR, supra note 88, at 3.

93. See Smith, supra note 91, at 37.
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need to account for the financial aspects of the arrangement affecting a
94
An agreement with a legal executor might include provisions for
practice.
paying earned legal fees to the estate of the deceased attorney, offering some
additional coverage of the estate costs, and potentially minimizing financial loss
to the heirs and family of the deceased attorney. 95
C. Negligence Analysis and Emergency Plans

It is not mere compliance with ethical rules that requires an attorney to plan
for disasters. 96 The reasonably foreseeable nature of disasters, whether large or
small, also relates to potential liability under a professional negligence
analysis.97 Courts commonly use a negligence analysis when considering cases
of alleged legal malpractice. In Texas, for example, an attorney "is held to the
standard of care which would be exercised by a reasonably prudent attorney,"
and that "standard is an objective exercise of professional judgment, not the
subjective belief that his acts are in good faith."9 In the ABA's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, negligence means that an attorney "fails to be
aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow,
which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer
would exercise in the situation."100
As Professor Binder indicated in his discussion of emergency action plans,
"[t]he essence of negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances," which is "based upon the reasonable foreseeability of the
risk."101 Professor Binder discussed other professionals in his analysis of
foreseeability, noting that architects and engineers who build large structures in
California should account for natural phenomena that may impact those areas.102
Furthermore, he noted that "[t]he foreseeability of these events creates a duty,

94. See id.
95. See id. at 40.
96. See Keim, supra note 34, at 28-29.
97. Binder, supra note 23, at 795.
98. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex. 1989) (citing Fireman's Fund
Am. Ins. Co. v. Patterson & Lamberty, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Patterson &
Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077, 1079 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904)) (stating that in Texas, legal
malpractice is based on negligence); see also Whalen v. Randle, 37 F. App'x 113, 120 (6th Cir.
2002) (citing Taliani v. Chrans, 189 F.3d 597, 598 (7th Cir. 1999)) (noting that the remedy for
negligence by a party's attorney is a legal malpractice suit); Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d
1104, 1117 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1360 (7th Cir. 1988); Inryco, Inc.
v. Metro. Eng'g Co., 708 F.2d 1225, 1235 (7th Cir. 1983)) (stating that a legal malpractice suit is a
general remedy for negligence by a party's attorney); Hodge v. Cichon, 78 So. 3d 719, 722 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Inv., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192, 194
(Fla. 1987)) (discussing negligence claim based on legal malpractice).
99. Cosgrove, 774 S.W.2d at 664-65.
100. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS theoretical framework, para.

7 (1991).
101. Binder, supra note 23, at 793.
102. Id. at 796.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss2/5

12

Crouch: In the Aftermath: Responsibility and Professionalism in the Wake
IN THE AFTERMATH

2013]

477

based upon the reasonable foreseeable risk, to employ reasonable care to reduce
the risks of a disaster."103 In United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,104 Judge
Learned Hand set forth an algebraic formula regarding negligence: "[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P"-whether B is less than PxL.105 Binder
adopted Judge Hand's equation to analyze the duty to prepare an emergency plan
under a negligence standard: "1. How likely is an emergency to occur? 2. What
are the potential consequences should it occur? 3. What safety precautions are
available?" 10 6
According to Binder, "[T]he ease of preparing and periodically updating an
emergency action plan will often outweigh the risk of not doing so."10 He noted
that, because all contingencies cannot be accounted for, the duty of reasonable
care does not guarantee that an emergency plan would apply perfectly to any one
disaster scenario.108 However, failing to follow the plan is "less defensible,"
even though some reasonable deviation may be justifiable depending on the
circumstances. 109

In Coates v. United States, 110 the government was found negligent in the
death of a camper after a dam located on National Park Service property
collapsed and the Park Service failed to warn all the campers who were in danger
of the resulting flood.
Of the four grounds on which the United States was
found negligent, the fourth was for failing "to maintain or implement a plan for
dealing with emergencies, such as the one involved here." 112 The court held that
the government created a specific legal relationship between itself and the people
who visit national parks by inviting the populace to enjoy these parks in
exchange for a monetary fee.113 By creating this relationship, the government
also created a duty to develop plans and procedures in case of an emergency.114
The court noted that it was imperative to create such a plan because there "is
little time for reflection" during an emergency, and "[e]lementary lapses,
obvious with the clarity of hindsight, could [be] avoided" by creating such a

103. Id.
104. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
105. Id. at 173.
106. Binder, supra note 23, at 798 (emphasis added). Another proposed interpretation of
Judge Hand's analysis is that "because the probability of a loss in the event of a natural disaster is
great, a lawyer that fails to create a simple disaster plan should be found liable." Brenna G. Nava,
Comment, Hurricane Katrina: The Duties and Responsibilities of an Attorney in the Wake of a
NaturalDisaster,37 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1153, 1170 (2006).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Binder, supra note 23, at 798.
Id. at 806-07.
Id. at 808.
612 F. Supp. 592 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
Id. at 594-95.
Id at 595.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 596.
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plan. 115 The court found that there was a duty to plan, that the government failed
to plan, and that the failure to plan was a proximate cause of the death of the
camper. 116
The Legal Ethics Counsel for the Supreme Court of Missouri issued a
surprisingly generous interpretation following the Joplin tornado, stating that to
fulfill the responsibility of maintaining client confidentiality of all information
under Missouri's Rule 4-1.6, "an attorney must take reasonable steps to keep the
information physically secure and to secure and backup electronic
information."' 7 In the face of reasonably foreseeable risks, failure to take
reasonable steps violates the provisions of the rule.118 According to the Ethics
Counsel, despite the potential exposure of confidential client information, the
Joplin tornado "was not a reasonably foreseeable risk." 119 This statement is
questionable, however, given that there have been three tornados in Joplin since
1971.120 Perhaps more relevant, an EF-5 tornado struck the town of Moore,
Oklahoma-located approximately 224 miles southeast of Joplin-on May 20,
2013.121 The assertion that a tornado occurring in that region is not reasonably
foreseeable seems untenable. Yet considering whether such occurrences are
reasonably foreseeable allows ethics or disciplinary counsels to account for the
sudden and dire nature of disasters, as demonstrated in the Dicks- Woolridge
case.122 Ultimately though, the reasonable conclusion stemming from the case is
that an attorney cannot count on this argument to absolve the failure to plan for
disasters.
IV. EMERGENCY PLANS AND THEIR USE BY THE LEGAL PROFESSION
As for my professional future, there was nothing I could do at that point
to change or augment the preparations I had already made. Whatever
decisions I had made in the past on flood insurance, the backing up of
files, storage of paper files, business interruption insurance, and
safeguarding of exhibits and valuables were irrevocable now. I soon
learned that I had done some things right but other things wrong.123

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Heerboth, supra note 5, at 11.
Id.
Id.

120. See Brad Belk, May Tornadoes Struck Joplin Twice in 1970s, JOPLIN GLOBE, May 8,

2010, available at http://www.joplinglobe.com/local/x1008080420/Brad-Belk-May-tomadoesstruck-Joplin-twice-in-1970s; Davis, supra note 4.
121. The Tornado Outbreak of May 20, 2013, NAT'L WEATHER SERV. WEATHER FORECAST

OFF., http://www.srh.oaa.gov/oun/?n-events-20130520 (last modified July 17, 2013).
122. In re Dicks-Woolridge, 371 S.C. 42, 50, 637 S.E.2d 565, 569 (2006).
123. McGovern, supra note 47, at 802.
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Professor Binder referenced the old saying "failing to plan is planning to
fail" in the title of his article on emergency plans.124 Making time to create and
implement emergency plans has real-world benefits to attorneys and law
firms.125 While forward-thinking attorneys and law firms have much to gain
from taking the time to establish emergency plans, those who are less prepared
stand to be placed in more danger, whether the danger is ethical or businessrelated.126
Professor Glesner warns that when a poorly organized or
overburdened law office confronts a client emergency, a synergistic effect
occurs, spawning additional crises and diverting already ill-used resources from
other matters. 127
Attorneys and firms seeking to establish a continuity of operations plan
(COOP), an emergency plan, or a business continuity plan certainly do not face a
dearth of resources. The ABA's Committee on Disaster Response and
Preparedness created a guide for attorneys, illustrating how to create and
implement business continuity plans; this Committee also provided a sample
template for such plans.128 The Nonprofit Coordinating Committee of New York
has prepared documents that enable legal services organizations and nonprofits
to craft and create emergency plans for those organizations-and for similar
organizations as well.129
Certain baseline matters must be addressed in an emergency plan created by
an attorney or a firm. Professor Gary A. Munneke proposed that a firm's basic
protections include: (1) a "contact tree" (not necessarily only a "phone" tree,
given how service can be affected); (2) basic first-aid equipment and supplies at
the office in a place known to everyone; (3) an "escape plan" from the building;
(4) an "assembly point" outside the building; (5) identification of a crisis leader;
and (6) maintaining cash in the event that banks or ATMs are unavailable.130
Because risks change, an emergency plan must be adaptive to change as well.
Thus, "[t]he specific type of event is less important for planning purposes than

124. Binder, supra note 23.
125. See Heerboth, supra note 5, at 7.
126. See id. at 8.
127. Glesner, supra note 22, at 323.
128. AM. BAR Ass'N. SPECIAL COMM. ON DISASTER RESPONSE & PREPAREDNESS,
SURVIVING A DISASTER: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DISASTER PLANNING (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/disaster/survivinga disaster a lawyersguide
to disasterplanning.authcheckdam.pdf. The ABA has continued to develop additional templates
and COOP plans. See generally ABA Comm. on Disaster Response & Preparedness, Resources,
A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/disaster/resources.html (last visited Oct.
28, 2013) (providing disaster preparation resources for attorneys, law firms, bar associations, and
courts).
129. NONPROFIT COORDINATING COMM. OF N.Y., DISASTER PLANNING, EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS & BUSINESS CONTINUITY (Jan. 2013), www.npceny.org/info/Disaster Planning.
doc.
130. Munneke, supra note 35, at 25.
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the possibility that some sort of damaging event might happen."l31 Attorneys
and firms should review emergency plans and make changes following disasters
in other locations, drawing upon the experiences of attorneys who underwent
these disasters. 132
An example of some hard lessons learned following disaster comes from the
national law firm of McGlinchey Stafford, which had an emergency plan that
was overcome by Katrina's severity.133 The managing partner stated that the
firm "had a plan for two or three days," but "[n]obody ever considered this kind
of evacuation and recovery." 134 The firm had to relocate over 140 of its New
Orleans-based attorneys and staff to its Baton Rouge office following the
storm.135 Since that time, the firm determined that it would likely maintain
excess capacity in each of its offices and develop a lan designating the office
location attorneys should head to when evacuating.
Similarly, another New
Orleans firm had a plan that included a backup computer system located in a
climate-controlled room on the third floor of a building a few miles from the
firm's offices-a building that had four feet of water blocking its entrance for
weeks after Katrina.137
The experiences mentioned above, along with lessons shared by New
Orleans-based attorney Glenn McGovern, certainly show how some plans can be
easily overcome by disaster-and why reassessing and amending plans after a
disaster is an integral part of emergency planning. McGovern's law office
suffered tremendous damage, not only from the nearly four feet of contaminated
salt water that accumulated in the office, but also from the rain that overloaded
the roof.138 The safe that contained his insurance paperwork, backup CDs, and
exhibits had corroded and could not be opened, while paper files stored over the
four-foot level were generally undamaged-although some began to smell. 139
While McGovern had a backup computer server on site at his office located
seven feet from the floor, it was destroyed when the roof failed. 140
McGovern credits the survival of his practice, in part, to his decision not to
have all of his practice or clients in one location.141 By accepting cases away

131. Thomas A. Birkland & Carrie A. Schneider, Emergency Management in the Courts:
Trends After September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, 28 JUST. SYs. J. 20, 23 (2007). Birkland and
Schneider describe these hazards as "low-probability, high-consequence events" whose effects are

so severe that, despite the unlikelihood of occurrence, they must be planned for in advance. Id.
132. See Binder, supra note 23, at 804 ("Emergency action plans are not static. They must be
reviewed periodically and revised in light of changing risks, lessons learned from other disasters,
and technological advances.").
133. See Carter,supra note 49, at 34.
134. Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. Id.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 36.
McGovern, supra note 47, at 806.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 812.
Id at 810.
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from his home location, he gave his practice a life preserver.142 After Katrina,
McGovern opened a satellite office ninety miles away from his main office; the
satellite office contains basic office essentials.143 He has an updated websitenoting that the Internet was the one thing not damaged by Katrina-and advises
listing cell phone numbers on both the website and the firm letterhead. 144
McGovern now keeps all his insurance paperwork in a separate location and
encourages attorneys to review policies for potential gaps in business
interruption coverage.145 McGovern changed his office computers to portable
laptops for ease of evacuation, with files containing copies of insurance policies,
an office inventory, and a checklist of client information with upcoming statutes
of limitations and legal deadlines.146 He also recommends keeping backups with
offsite services in secured facilities, setting aside a financial reserve to maintain
business operations while insurance matters are handled, and having a
communicated staff retention policy. 147
V. PRO BONO IN TIMES OF DISASTER
The problems that arise in relation to disasters are multifaceted. When
disasters strike, many attorneys cannot-or will not-help those who might be in
the greatest need.
Many times, attorneys who are perfectly capable of
performing pro bono work for those affected by a disaster decide not to help
because they feel that their area of practice does not lend itself to aiding in those
cases.149 Another consideration is that representing victims of disaster, which
often involves one-shot clients or clients of limited means, discourages firms
from undertaking emergency representation as this takes time away from more
lucrative or existing clients.150
While evidence indicates that, in recent years, larger firms have shouldered
more pro bono obligations,15 one interpretation of these statistics suggests
otherwise.152 Assuming that attorneys at these firms bill 2,000 hours annually,
they generally contribute approximately 1%of their collective time to pro bono

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id
Id
Id. at 810-11.
Id. at 811, 812-13.
Id. at 812, 813, 816.
Id. at 812, 815.
See Glesner, supra note 22, at 335-36.

149. See id.
150. Id. at 334.
151. See Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, ManagingPro Bono: Doing Well by Doing
Better, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2376 (2010) (citing Steven A. Boutcher, The Institutionalization
of Pro Bono in Large Law Firms: Trends and Variation Across the AmLaw200, in PRIVATE
LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 145 & fig.7.2 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009)).
152. See Richard Abel, The ParadoxesofPro Bono, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2443, 2444 (2010)

(citing Cummings & Rhode, supranote 151, at 2376).
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service.153 After reviewing the volunteer efforts from attorneys following the
September 11 attacks, Professor Rhode noted the "gap between our ideals and
institutions." 154 According to Rhode, "Thousands of New York lawyers gave
generously at a time of crisis. Thousands more did not. Of those who did
volunteer, the average time commitment was less than fifty hours-under an
hour a week for the year."155 In her analysis of an informal survey taken after
the September 11 attacks, Rhode listed a number of factors attorneys cited in
deciding not to make future contributions of their time.156 For 66% of firm
attorneys and 44% of solo practitioners, the primary reason was "too busy"; also,
a notable supporting reason of "practice doesn't lend itself to pro bono work"
was cited by 17% of both firm and solo practitioners. 15 7
While firms often encourage membership on boards of charitable or cultural
organizations-designed to attract clientele under the guise of encouraging pro
bono work-this effectively limits the scope of services available to those who
have the most need for representation.
Rhode also found that attitudes
regarding what qualifies as pro bono work were not far from the same loose
definition of pro bono Glesner found in his research: work is pro bono if it
involves "favors for clients, friends, or partners, the 'pet causes' of certain
powerful practitioners, or projects designed primarily to enhance the
organization's image." 159 When such reasoning and behavioral norms are
encouraged-or at least tolerated-in the profession, this encouragement
exacerbates the negative synergistic effect Glesner discusses, placing more work
on overburdened organizations, especially following a disaster. 160
The notion of a generalist attorney has given way to specialized professional
roles, which has led to a disincentive to provide emergency representation unless
such representation is either related to an attorney's specialty or the matter is
relatively simple.161 This mindset-in which attorneys think that their particular
expertise is not suited for legal services in post-disaster situations-creates one

153. See id.
154. Rhode, supra note 19, at 1011.

155. Id. A special report was prepared detailing the legal community's response to 9/11,
including lessons learned about the practical aspects of responding to a disaster; one of these lessons
contained the following conclusion: "Lawyers who believe they cannot find volunteer opportunities
because of their practice specialty should reconsider their views in light of 9/11." ASS'N OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. FUND, INC. ET AL., PUBLIC SERVICE IN A TIME OF CRISIS: A REPORT
AND RETROSPECTIVE ON THE LEGAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11,

2001, reprinted in 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 931 (2004) [hereinafter ABCNY FUND ET AL.].
156. Rhode, supra note 19, at 1017 (citing ABCNY FUND ET AL., supra note 155, at 924).
157. Id. (citing ABCNY FUND ET AL., supranote 155, at 924).
158. See Glesner, supra note 22, at 383-84 (citing Cameron Barr, Doers and Talkers, AM. L.,

July-Aug. 1990, at 58).
159. Rhode, supra note 19, at 1018.
160. See Glesner, supra note 22, at 383 ("To the extent that the entire profession does not take
seriously its responsibility to provide pro bono service to the poor, the caseload pressures on legal
services organizations only increase.").
161. Id. at 335-36.
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of the major hurdles to providing pro bono services.162 In most cases, however,
these concems are specious.163 According to Susan Marmaduke, "Lawyers are
trained to listen, to assimilate information quickly, and to communicate clearly.
We are accustomed to solving problems under time pressure, in rapidly changing
circumstances, and amidst high emotions. All of those skills are necessary to
respond effectively to a disaster."1 6 4
An excellent example comes from the dire need for representation of
criminal defendants that arose in post-Katrina Louisiana. While the cause of that
need is discussed in more depth below, the problem existed pre-Katrina, as "a
well-known and common divide existed between the overwhelming majority of
civil attorneys and the relatively small criminal defense bar."1 65 After Katrina,
the Louisiana State Bar Association sought help from its membership to provide
urgent pro bono assistance for criminal matters.166 While 600 to 800 attorneys
responded, they only offered civil law assistance.167 Eight months after Katrina,
some 150 to 200 civil practitioners volunteered to help the public defenders;
these attorneys were given training in criminal defense matters and accepted
several hundred cases involving minor charges.168 Questioning the civil
attorneys' view that they could not contribute to indigent defense in crisis
situations, Professor Colbert stated that "[c]riminal law practice is not rocket
science; most civil attorneys are smart and fully capable of applying their
experienced practice skills to interview people and obtain basic factual
information to show that the person had served the imposed sentence and was
now being held illegally."1 69 Colbert suggests that "more advanced lawyering
skills, such as counseling, negotiation, and trial preparation" would have been
useful in presenting a defense for those incarcerated.
The opportunity to assist in post-disaster times through pro bono service is
not limited to criminal defense. A huge proportion of the legal services needed
in those times involves helping individuals deal with civil matters-including
property damage-and aiding businesses with almost every aspect of their
operations. Additionally, child custody and support matters quickly arose after
Katrina, with one attorney describing these matters as practical issues-such as a
father evacuating with his daughter but failing to contact his ex-wife, who had no
idea where the father or the child were.171 Landlord-tenant matters were also

162. See id.

163. See id. (noting that attorneys in these situations should associate with specialists within
that area of the law).
164. Susan Marmaduke, PartingThoughts: The Role ofLawyers in Times of Crisis, OR. ST. B.

BULL., Dec. 2005, at 62.
165. Douglas L. Colbert, ProfessionalResponsibilityin Crisis, 51 How. L.J. 677, 728 (2008).

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728.
G.M. Filisko, WhatDidKatrinaTeach Us?, A.B.A. J., July 2011, at 33, 36.
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common, with examples from New Orleans raring from landlords ignoring
tenant rights to tenants never paying rent again.
Insurance and construction
claims are also common after disasters, as are probate matters involving
guardianships or probating estates and wills.173 Common to any aspect of civil
law, replacing and drafting new legal documents may be required following a
disaster. 174
In her analysis of the ethics of emergency lawyering, Glesner suggests that
"competence"-as utilized in Model Rule 1.1-supports a conclusion that, even
if an attorney errs in a matter involving emergency representation, it is likely that
there might not be a disciplinary consequence, unless the attorney's error was
indicative of overall incompetence or the error was linked to neglect or an
affirmative wrong. 175 Glesner proposes standards for emergency representation
of clients,176 which have utility in establishing a baseline standard of quality for
such representation and that incorporate the admonitions of the Model Rules, the
requirements of Rule 11, and malpractice concerns.177
A.

Changes to Pro Bono Model Rules Post-Katrina

Following Katrina, an exchange of attorneys took place: large groups of
attorneys were displaced, while many attorneys wanted to come to the areas
affected to provide assistance, including pro bono work.
Thousands of
attorneys in Louisiana and Mississippi lost their homes, their law practices, or
both.
The ABA reported that over 1,750 volunteers-comprised of attorneys
licensed in almost every state, as well as attorneys licensed in Puerto Rico and
the United States Virgin Islands-indicated their willingness to offer pro bono
assistance through a web site established by the ABA.1so Both of these situations
directly implicated provisions of the Model Rules and precipitated changes in the
Model Rules in anticipation of future disasters.181

172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id.
See Glesner, supranote 22, at 342-43.

176. Id. at 369.
177. See generally id. at 339-69 (discussing how the Model Rules, Rule 11, and malpractice
cases are helpful in determining standards for emergency representation).
178. See Filisko, supra note 171, at 36-37.
179. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also AM. BAR Ass'N, IN THE WAKE OF
THE STORM: THE ABA RESPONDS TO HURRICANE KATRINA 10 (2006), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/executivedirector/reports/aba katrinareport.a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
180. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 179, at 12. Sadly, a survey indicated that local legal
service providers and pro bono coordinators in the affected areas contacted only 12% of the
volunteer attorneys. Id. at 13. The American Bar Association stated that this was largely due to
problems with infrastructure and logistics in coordinating and deploying volunteers. Id.
181. See Filisko, supra note 171, at 37; Michael H. Rubin & Beth E. Abramson, Lessons
Learned (the Hard Way) by Lawyers During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, PROB. & PROP.,

Sept./Oct. 2006, at 25, 25.
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Model Rule 5.5, relating to the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) and
multi-jurisdictional practice of law (MJP), provides that attorneys shall not
practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession
in that jurisdiction. 182 This restriction includes prohibitions against establishing
an office or systematic presence in the jurisdiction, except as otherwise
authorized.183 The comments recognize that there are occasions when an
attorney already admitted in a state-and not suspended or disbarred-may
provide legal services "on a temporary basis" in some circumstances, namely
those set out in Model Rule 5.5(c), which is not an exclusive list.184 The
comments also note that "no single test" is used to determine the "temporary
basis" of the circumstances of Model Rule 5.5(c).185 Neither Model Rule 5.5 nor
its comments address situations related to disasters.
Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, nineteen states either altered or
amended their UPL and MJP rules to accommodate displaced attorneys from
affected states by granting these attorneys tempora 7 reciprocity while they were
relocated outside of their home jurisdictions.
However, there was no
uniformity to these rules. 187 Different states placed varying durations on the
reciprocity time allowed: some states limited areas of practice or limited
displaced attorneys to only assisting existing clients from the attorney's original
state; some states required the attorneys to practice in association with local
attorneys; some required displaced attorneys to advise clients that they were not
licensed in that state; some states only allowed attorneys from states specifically
affected (for example, Alabama's rule only permitted Mississippi or Louisiana
attorneys); and some states reduced or waived fees for displaced attorneys who
sought admission to the state bar.188
As commentators have suggested, the provisions of Model Rule 5.5(c)
allowing licensed attorneys to provide temporary legal services in a state in
which they are not admitted to practice, provided that such work is done "in
association with a lawyer" in that jurisdiction, were inadequate in light of the
tremendous need for pro bono services that existed following Katrina.1 89 None
of the exceptions in Model Rule 5.5 covered out-of-state attorneys who provide
pro bono assistance in areas that suffered a disaster. 190 Following Katrina and
Rita, individual states created special rules to allow for such assistance. 191

182. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2013).

183. Id. R. 5.5(b).
184. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 5. Model Rule 5.5(d) provides exceptions for in-house government and
corporate attorneys and attorneys in federal practice. Id. R. 5.5(d) cmt. 16.
185. Id. R. 5.5 cmt. 6.
186. Rubin & Abramson, supra note 181, at 25.
187. Id.
188. See id. at 28-32 (providing a table noting the status of the practice of law in different
states for displaced attorneys after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita).
189. Id. at 26.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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On October 10, 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued an "Emergency
Pro Bono Civil Legal Assistance Rule" (Emergency Rule) that was effective
until February 28, 2006.192 The Emergency Rule allowed attorneys who were

not licensed in Louisiana to provide legal services in prescribed situations,
specifically in civil matters involving "rights, remedies, claims, defenses, injury,
or damages resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and their aftermath."193
Such limited representation did not extend to representation in Louisiana courts
or administrative proceedings, and the services could only be rendered through
the Louisiana State Bar Association or the ABA Young Lawyers Division Legal
Assistance Program.194 Mississippi and Texas also issued emergency pro bono
orders and included provisions requiring attorneys to provide assistance through
the organizations specifically listed in the orders. 95
The ABA adopted the "Model Court Rule on Provision of Legal Services

Following Determination of Major Disaster" (Model Court Rule), sometimes
referred to as the "Katrina Rule," in 2007.196 Comment 14 of Model Rule 5.5
was also amended as part of the adoption of the Model Court Rule.197 The ABA
began developing the Model Court Rule in February 2006, in an effort to create a

uniform method to handle displaced attorneys and to better enable attorneys to
provide pro bono services in areas affected by disaster. 198
The Model Court Rule becomes effective when the highest court of a state

determines that an emergency affecting the justice s stem, caused by a natural or
other major disaster, has occurred in that state. Until the court makes this
determination, the highest courts of other states may not authorize the provisions

192. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Louisiana Order, Emergency Pro Bono Civil Legal
Assistance Rule (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ladb.org/forms/emergency%/2Opro
o20bonoo20civilo20legalo20assistanceo20rule.pdf ("A lawyer not admitted to practice law in
Louisiana but who is admitted in another United States jurisdiction ... may provide temporary
emergency pro bono legal assistance. . .
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See In re Rules of Professional Conduct, No. 89-R-99018-SCT (Miss. Oct. 13, 2005),
available at http://courts.ms.gov/news/2005/snl27311.pdf; Amended Emergency Order Permitting
Lawyers Displaced by Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita to Continue Representing Clients from
Temporary Offices in Texas, Misc. Docket No. 05-9171 (Tex. Oct. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/misedocket/05/05917100.pdf.
196. Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommendation 104 Adopted by the H.D., at 1 (Feb. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Model Rule on Legal Services], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/disaster/docs/model court rule.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Filisko, supra note 171, at
34 (noting that this rule is referred to as the "Katrina Rule").
197. Model Rule on Legal Services, supra note 196, at 1.
198. Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Client Prot., Revised Rep. to H.D. 104, at 9 (Jan. 29, 2007)
[hereinafter Delegate Report], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/cpr/Katrina.authcheckdam.pdf. The ABA determined that a Model Court Rule was more
appropriate than a Model Rule because "the creation of a mechanism for making legal services
available is not an ethical, but essentially an administrative and operational concern of each state's
highest court." Id. at 10.
199. Id at 11.
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of the Model Court Rule in the affected state.200 Under the Model Court Rule,
licensed attorneys in good standing from any jurisdiction are authorized to enter
the affected jurisdiction and provide temporary pro bono services, provided that
the services are "supervised through an established not-for-profit bar association,
pro bono program or legal services program," designated by that jurisdiction's
highest court.
While displaced attorneys are authorized to practice law in
unaffected jurisdictions under the Model Court Rule, the legal services offered
by displaced attorneys "must arise out of and be reasonably related to that
lawyer's practice of law in the jurisdiction ... where the major disaster
occurred.,,02 These temporary rules apply until the state's highest court
determines that "the conditions caused by the major disaster ... have ended." 203
The most recent information from the ABA indicates that, as of November
8, 2012, sixteen states adopted the Model Court Rule, fifteen states were
considering adoption, and eight states declined to adopt the Model Court Rule. 204
VI. PROFESSIONALISM, THE RULE OF LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE AFTER DISASTERS

I may have lost everything physical in my law office, but my life as an
attorney still has purpose. I am here to serve clients in Louisiana in their
time of need. I have chosen to stay and fight. They respect me more
than ever for that. My purpose in being an attorney still exists and has
never been more important to me at any other point in my career. Even
Hurricane Katrina did not destroy that.205
Glenn McGovern's words drive directly to the purpose of the Model Rules
and the ideals of professionalism. The first sentence of the preamble to the
Model Rules is instructive: "A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having a special responsibility for the quality ofjustice." 206 As one commentator
noted, the presumptive duty to a client is not absolute because, as members of a
public profession, attorneys have to account for the consequences of their actions

200. Model Rule on Legal Services, supra note 196, at 1.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2. Displaced attorneys so authorized under this section must not be disbarred or
suspended. Id.
203. Id.
204. AM. BAR Ass'N, COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MODEL
COURT RULE ON PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES FOLLOWING DETERMINATION OF MAJOR
DISASTER 1 (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional responsibility/katrina chart.authcheckdam.pdf.
205. McGovern, supra note 47, at 816.
206. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 1 (2013).
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to others and to society as a whole. 20 7 It is these non-client responsibilities that
have the most bearing on the usage of the term professionalism.
Professor Campbell's definition of professionalism remains appropriate.
That is, professionalism is the "affirmative obligations of the lawyer to the
broader society" and is different from ethics or morality because it recognizes
the attorney's obligation to the fundamental tenets of a democratic society.210
Additionally, "[P]rofessionalism is the courage to care about and act for the
benefit of our clients, our peers, our careers, and the public good." 2 11
Another term, while decidedly applicable to the roles the justice system and
the legal profession play following disasters, is the subject of much discussion
particularly given its commonplace usage under a variety of conditions: the rule
212
Agreeing on a single definition of the rule of law seems near
of law.
impossible given the multitudinous constructs in which this term is used.213
Appropriate to the considerations here, Professor Waldron described the rule of
law as "a fragile but crucial ideal ... appropriately invoked whenever
governments try to get their way by arbitrary and oppressive action or by shortcircuiting the norms and procedures laid down in their countries' laws or
constitution." 2 14 Waldron further noted that "the [r]ule of [1]aw is violated when
the norms that are applied by officials do not correspond to the norms that have
been made public to the citizens, or when officials act on the basis of their own
discretion rather than norms laid down in advance." 215
Perhaps a negative definition of justice best frames the usage of the terms
and issues discussed in this Part-a recognition of injustice and, therefrom,
justice.216 As one scholar proposed, "[I]n fact, it is precisely the experience of
injustice-of the wrongs suffered; of the losses incurred; of the suffering
endured-that may allow us to frame, in a sort of a contrario construction, an
idea of 'justice' that is anchored to reality."217 In building a framework of

207. Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, Moral
Character,and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 113, 138 (1995).
208. See, e.g., Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to be Civil: Defining
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GoNZ. L. REv. 99, 137-41 (2011)

(citations omitted) ("The professional obligation of lawyers are those responsibilities assumed, not
on behalf of the client or even the court, but rather on behalf of society as a whole.").
209. See id. at 139-41.
210. Id. at 139.
211. OR. STATE BAR, STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONALISM (Dec. 12, 2011), available at

http://www.osbar.org/_docs/forms/Prof-ord.pdf.
212. See Dan E. Stigall, The Rule ofLaw: A Primer and a Proposal, 189 MIL. L. REv. 92, 93

(2006).
213. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule ofLaw" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse,

97 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1997); Stigall, supra note 212, at 93.
214. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule ofLaw, 43 GA. L. REv. 1, 5 (2008).
215. Id. at 6.
216. See Mike C. Materni, Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice, 2 BRIT. J. AM.
LEGAL STUD. 263, 283 (2013).

217. Id.
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various experiences following disaster, it becomes apparent that even though the
legal profession strives for the special quality of justice, attorneys still have some
distance to go.
A.

Statutes of Limitations, Civility, and Equity from Courts and Opposing
Counsel

Obligations relating to legal deadlines are of great importance to attorneys;
yet, in the destruction accompanying Katrina, numerous attorneys were left
without homes or offices, which made compliance with statutory, regulatory, and
court deadlines almost impossible.218 Looming over this situation is the
proposition that "[n]either hurricanes nor other natural disasters delay or toll the
statute of limitations." 2 19
Opposing counsel and the courts themselves are often a primary source of
equity and civility when disaster strikes.220 While the Model Rules do not
mandate that an attorney or tribunal account for a disaster that befalls opposing
counsel, such considerations have been easily given in numerous instances, such
as when opposing counsel moved for continuances in cases involving Joplin
attorneys without requiring them to file the motions themselves.22 1 One attorney
who evacuated from New Orleans to Arkansas randomly found out about a
hearing in a case he was defending, though he had not received notice. 222 The
attorney's opposing counsel not only called him to inform him of the hearing,
but also drafted and filed the attorney's motion to continue the hearing for
him. 223
Courts have also equitably tolled statutes of limitations following disaster.224
In one instance, a law firm filed for relief from the statutes of limitations and
filing deadlines in all of the firm's cases due to a fire in the firm's office that
225
occurred the previous week.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the
relief requested, but limited it to cases in which client files were damaged or
destroyed in the fire.226 Using its discretion and finding that the state supreme
court properly tolled the statutes of limitations, the federal district court

218. See Varnado & Ciolino, supranote 39, at 8.
219. Keim, supra note 34, at 30.
220. See, e.g., In re Propulsid, No. MDL 1355, 2005 WL 2787634, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 18,
2005) (stating that opposing counsel agreed to extend deadlines for claims submissions due to issues
affecting plaintiffs counsel post-Katrina); Heerboth, supra note 5, at 10 (discussing how Joplin
attorneys and courts moved deadlines on cases without attorneys filing for continuances).
221. See Heerboth, supra note 5, at 10.
222. See Nahum D. Loventhal, Help in Continuinga Hearing,53 LA. B.J. 293, 293 (Dec./Jan.
2006).
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Coleman v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., NV, 887 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.R.I. 1995)
(equitably tolling the statute of limitations when there was a fire in counsel's office).
225. Id. at 50.

226. Id.
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equitably tolled the maritime statute of limitations in an action pending before
it.27 In doing so, the federal district court noted that "a fire is an extenuating
circumstance, that, in the interest of justice, should not be allowed to deprive
plaintiffs of their right to seek compensation ... where the plaintiffs' attorneys
acted responsibly in preserving the rights of his clients."22 8 In a footnote, the
court stated that "it is irrelevant ... whether the file was actually destroyed. The
amount of disruption caused by a fire in a legal office is sufficient to warrant a
brief toll of limitations statutes."229
Additionally, in an opinion concerning mass tort claims, the Mississippi
Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulties affecting the region post-Katrina
and concluded that it was "appropriate under the circumstances for the trial court
to determine the period of time for ... counsel to provide the information as
ordered." 230 In doing so, the court noted that "[t]he immense devastation visited
upon the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina requires that this Court be sensitive to
the possibility of extreme hardship in cases including lawyers and parties from
the affected area." 231
Some courts have been clear in holding that there are some limits to equity
and excuse following disasters. 232 For example, one Florida court found that a
law office closure was good cause for delay in filling out a mediation
questionnaire when the attorney's office was in the direct path of three different
hurricanes, but the excusable delay only included the ten working days the office
was actually closed and did not justify filing the questionnaire over two months
late. 233 Decisions from other courts seem to indicate that merely referencing a
disaster is not sufficient cause for a court to exercise equitable powers. 234 For
example, a fourth request for an extension to file a brief by a pro se appellant
was refused in a case in which the appellant claimed that "[b]ecause of
unexpected emergencies and interruptions (including the uncertainties which

227. Id. at 52.
228. Id. at 53.
229. Id. at 53 n.2.
230. 3M Co. v. Glass, 917 So. 2d 90, 94 (Miss. 2005); see also United States v. Shugart, No.
CRIM. 505CR6DCBJCS, 2005 WL 3263367, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 22, 2005) (discussing the need
for alternative venues based on unavailability of two courthouses due to Katrina).
231. 3M Co., 917 So. 2d at 94 n.12.
232. See, e.g., Matajek v. Skowronska, 893 So. 2d 700, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating
that it was not excusable for counsel to file a mediation questionnaire two months late when the
counsel's law offices were closed for only ten days due to hurricanes); Rudder v. Wash. Mut. Bank,
No. 2-04-360-CV, 2005 WL 3008424, at *1 (Tex. App. Nov. 10, 2005) (per curiam) (dismissing an
appeal when counsel failed to file a brief that was more than six months overdue and counsel stated
the reason was because of hurricanes).
233. Matajek, 893 So. 2d. at 701.
234. See, e.g., Ramirez v. McCravy, 4 So. 3d 692, 693-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate how six different weather emergencies and the related
administrative orders tolling the statute of limitations due to court closures were relevant to his late
filing of an accident claim four years after the accident occurred); Rudder, 2005 WL 3008424, at *1
(denying counsel's fourth motion to extend time to file the appellant's brief when counsel stated
that the extension was necessary due to recent hurricanes in the area).
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existed for everyone during the recent hurricanes), it is mandatory for the
Appellant to seek another extension." 235
In two cases from October 2005, motions to transfer venue from the
Galveston Division of the Southern District of Texas to the Eastern and Western
Districts of Louisiana were denied, with both orders noting that, while not fitting
neatly into one of the established factors for consideration of transfer motions,
the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita "cannot be ignored." 23 6
Judge Samuel B. Kent, no stranger to hyperbole,237 held that to transfer a case to
the Eastern District of Louisiana "would be to utterly disregard the most
catastrophic natural disaster this nation has seen in the past century."238 He also
held that, while the other case would have been transferred to the Western
District of Louisiana under normal circumstances, a transfer could possibly
cause significant delay and undue burden to that court due to the disasters;
furthermore, transferring venue would also disregard "the impact of recent
catastrophic events on the great State of Louisiana." 239 Just over a month after
issuing these orders, Judge Kent granted a motion to transfer venue to the
Western District of Louisiana, where the plaintiff had argued that the havoc
created by the hurricanes caused a substantial backlog of cases.240 According to
that order, the court contacted the deputy clerk in charge of the Western District
of Louisiana, who advised the court that they were reporting no backlogs and
that the division was "running at its normal pace and schedule"-which
indicated no grounds to support the argument that delay or prejudice would
result from the transfer.241
Though the post-Katrina actions taken by the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches in Louisiana recognized and addressed many of the concerns
regarding legal deadlines, questions were raised afterwards about whether such
actions were truly just, if not patently unwarranted or illegal. On September 1,
2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued an order freezing deadlines and court
242
Five days after this order was
proceedings through September 30, 2005.

235. Rudder, 2005 WL 3008424, at *1.
236. Valdez v. Int'l Boat Rentals, Inc., No. G-05-238, 2005 WL 2488432, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 6, 2005); Campbell v. Dynamic Cranes, LLC, No. Civ.A. G-05-241, 2005 WL 2562091, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2005).
237. See, e.g., Smith v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 943 F. Supp. 782, 785 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
("Alas, this Court's kingdom for a commercial airport!"). See generally Douglas R. Richmond,
Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L. REv. 325, 325-26 (2012) (citing Kent Sentenced to Almost Three
Years in Prison, GALVESTON COUNTY DAILY NEWS, May 12, 2009) (mentioning how Kent's

career "flamed out" following accusations of sexual assault and his guilty plea to obstruction of
justice).

238. Valdez, 2005 WL 2488432, at *2.
239. Campbell, 2005 WL 2562091, at *3.
240. See Davidson v. Moncla Marine Operations, LLC, No. Civ. A. G-05-379, 2005 WL
3058170, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2005).
241. See id.
242. See Press Release, La. Supreme Court, Louisiana Supreme Court Update from Chief
Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. (Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.lasc.org/press room/press
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entered, Governor Kathleen Blanco issued Executive Order No. KBB 2005-32,
providing that all deadlines in legal proceedings, "including liberative[,]
prescriptive[,] and peremptive periods in all courts, administrative agencies, and
boards," were suspended until at least September 25, 2005; this order applied
retroactively, beginning on August 29, 2005.243 Governor Blanco extended the
suspension for an additional thirty days on September 23, 2005, as Hurricane
Rita was approaching. 244 Her second order specifically included "nonconstitutionally mandated deadlines in criminal proceedings" in the
suspension-language that was not present in the first order.245 On October 19,
2005, Governor Blanco issued another executive order, suspending liberative,
prescri tive, and peremptive periods statewide until at least November 25,
2005.
During a special session, the Louisiana legislature ratified the Governor's
suspension orders and extended certain legal deadlines until January 3, 2006,
providing a possible extension for the parishes that had been hit the hardest. 24 7
The legislature also enacted the Criminal Justice Emergency and Disaster Act248
during this special session, vesting the Louisiana Supreme Court with the power
to order emergency court sessions in alternative locations outside of the disasteraffected jurisdictions in cases involving inmates subject to criminal
prosecution.249 According to one justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, this
act allowed the court to suspend habeas corpus in the event that the Governor
declared a state of emergency.250

releases/2005/2005-12.asp. The Louisiana Supreme Court later extended its closure to October 25,
2005. Id.
243. See Exec. Order No. KBB 05-32, La. Reg. 2169 (Sept. 6, 2005), available at
http://doa.louisianna.gov/osr/other/kbb05-32.htm. Peremption under Louisiana law is essentially
the same as a statute of repose in common-law states. Varnado & Ciolino, supra note 39, at 17
n.10. See generally Majorie Nieset Neufeld, Prescription and Peremption-the 1982 Revision of
the Louisiana Civil Code, 58 TuL. L. REv. 593, 60106 (1983) (citations omitted) (explaining
peremption in Louisiana).
244. See Exec. Order KBB 05-48, La. Reg. 2352 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at
http://doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/kbb05-48.htm.
245. Compare id. (suspending all legal deadlines in all legal proceedings), with Exec. Order
KBB 05-32, available at http://l1doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/kbb05-32.htm (suspending all legal
deadlines except those in criminal proceedings).
246. See Exec. Order KBB 05-67, La. Reg. 2675 (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://doa.louisiana.gov/osr/other/kbb05-67.htm.
247. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§§

9:5821-24 (2007).

248. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 941-44 (2008).
249. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 944 (2008); see also Greg G. Guidry, The
Louisiana Judiciary: In the Wake of Destruction, 70 LA. L. REv. 1145, 1163 (2010) (citing LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 941-944 (2008)).
250. Guidry, supra note 249, at 1163 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 944(a) (2008)).
Compare U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."), and
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 21 ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended."), with LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 945(B) (2012) ("Venue for a writ of habeas corpus for an individual whose
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Some suggest that these quick reactions aided attorneys and protected clients
from the consequences of missing deadlines.251 However, this positive opinion
is not universally held.252 As Judge Sarah Vance described it, with Katrina
"came an almost complete breakdown of the justice system in New Orleans." 25 3
The orders and acts noted above may have contributed to one of the greater
injustices that arose out of Katrina, which this Part now addresses.
B. The Rule ofLaw Meets "KatrinaTime"

Among the examples of abuses of the rule of law included in Professor
Waldron's article was "detaining people without any safeguards of due
process."254 In the wake of Katrina, this example proved to be all too real.
Persons arrested in New Orleans before Katrina served two kinds of time in
jail255: (1) police-sentencing time, which involved being jailed for forty-five days
or sixty days between an arrest and an eventual decision not to prosecute,
followed by (2) DA time, which involved remaining jailed due to inability to
make bail or bond. 256 On an average day, almost 6,500 individuals were housed
in the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP), making it one of the largest local jails in the
United States-despite New Orleans's status as only the thirty-fifth most
populous city.257 Over half of OPP's population consisted of people arrested for

physical custody has been transferred as a result of the circumstances which are the basis for the
emergency session shall be in the parish of East Baton Rouge.").
251. See Vamado & Ciolino, supranote 39, at 8.
252. See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The
Constitution After HurricaneKatrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127 (2006) (criticizing actions of the Louisiana

judicial, executive, and legislative branches for systematic failures following Katrina). But cf
Guidry, supra note 249, at 1155-67 (asserting that the Louisiana Supreme Court met daily and took
on new duties in an effort to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants in the immediate
aftermath of Katrina).
253. Hon. Sarah S. Vance, Justice After Disaster-WhatHurricaneKatrina Did to the Justice
System in New Orleans, 51 How. L.J. 621, 622 (2008).

254. Waldron, supra note 214, at 5.
255. Phyllis E. Mann, HurricanesKatrina and Rita A Year Later In Louisiana, CHAMPION,

Dec. 2006, at 6, 8.
256. Id.
257. NAT'L PRISON PROJECT, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ABANDONED AND ABUSED:

ORLEANS PARISH PRISONERS IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE KATRINA 13 (2006) [hereinafter NPP
REPORT] (citing PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 2088081, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, at 10 (2005),

available at http://www.opj.usdoj.bjs/pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf), available at http://www.aclu.org/
files/pdfs/prison/oppreport2006O8O9.pdf (noting that OPP is the ninth largest local jail in the United
States); but see Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 252, at 135 (noting that OPP is the seventh largest jail
in the country). The actual number of prisoners at OPP when Katrina struck is unclear-estimates
range from 6,021 to almost 8,000. NPP REPORT, supra at 29 (citing JEFFREY A. SCHWARTZ &
DAVID WEBB, TA No. 06P1035, HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND THE LOUISIANA DEP'T OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS: A CHRONICLE AND CRITICAL INCIDENT REvIEw 19 (May 10,

2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal justice
section newsletter/crimjust katrinanicreport.authcheckdam.pdf).
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traffic violations, municipal violations, or minor offenses such as public
intoxication, failure to pay a fine, or attachments; most of the prisoners were
pretrial detainees who had not been convicted of any crimes.258
In the devastation and confusion caused by Katrina, thousands of OPP
prisoners were scattered in jails and prisons across Louisiana, where allegations
of mistreatment and disregard of prisoners' rights were widely reported.259
Many of the OPP prisoners began doing what became known as "Katrina
time"-remaining in jail or prison, in many cases without being charged or
arraigned, for a period of time far exceeding the maximum sentence they would
have received if they had been found guilty.
Garrett and Tetlow contend that even if habeas corpus was not explicitly
suspended in Louisiana, it was all but extinguished for these prisoners:
After Katrina, thousands languished in state prisons for months,
awaiting a chance to meet with an attorney and a decision of whether the
prosecutor would proceed (required under state law within sixty days).
Without any legislative suspension of habeas corpus, the state court
system suspended its rules and failed to hold any hearings regarding the
prisoners. Only a few state courts haltingly granted habeas petitions and
ordered release of prisoners. And again, most prisoners had no access to
counsel and only a few were represented by counsel to file habeas
petitions. Worse, when a few trial judges did approve the grant of
habeas corpus petitions, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and
delayed the releases, citing its suspension of court deadlines. Federal
courts granted relief to only a few prisoners. 261
No criminal trials were held in New Orleans between September 2005 and
June 2006.262 In the years since Katrina, some courts found that the delays in
arraignments and other criminal rocesses caused by Katrina were justifiable.
For example, in State v. Watson, the defendant argued that his rights were
prejudiced when he was incarcerated for ten months without arraignment or
advice of counsel.264 Following Katrina, Watson was moved to a number of
different prisons, and while some of those prisons were able to conduct video
arraignments, the state did not believe the facility in which Watson was held had
such capabilities, which the state argued constituted just cause for delay.265 The

258. NPP REPORT, supra note 257, at 13.

259. Id. at 73-87 (citations omitted).
260. Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 252, at 128, 139, 148 (citation omitted); see also Mann,
supranote 255, at 8.

261. Id. at 157-58.
262. NPP REPORT, supra note 257, at 88 (citing DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE:
HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THE MississiPPi GULF COAST 1 (2006)).

263. State v. Watson, 993 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
264. Id. at 785.
265. Id. at 786.
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state contended that Watson's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not
violated because the delay was not presumptively prejudicial: Watson was
unable to show any particular prejudice from the delay, and the delay was
266
beyond the control the state. Taking judicial notice of the hurricane and of the
difficulties regarding transporting inmates, the trial court found that there was
justifiable reason for the delay in the arraignment, and the court of appeals
affirmed its judgment. 267
The ABA issued "The Rule of Law in Times of Major Disaster," consisting
of twelve principles (ROL Principles), in 2007. 268 The purpose of the ROL
Principles is to ensure that the rule of law is preserved following a disaster. 269
The ROL Principles note that, while the executive and legislative branches
declare and respond to a disaster, "it is the responsibility of the courts, the
organized bar, prosecutors, public defenders, providers of legal services to the
poor, and individual lawyers to insure that society's response conforms with the
dictates of law and fairness." 270 The first ROL Principle is that "[t]he rule of law
must be preserved when a major disaster occurs."271 Other ROL Principles note
272
that planning and preparation is required to preserve the rule of law, and that
the requirements of the Constitution must be respected in times of major
273
disaster-with special attention to criminal prosecution.
Some of the ROL
Principles are blunt: "Major disasters do not abrogate the Constitution."274 The
notes discussing the ROL Principles acknowledge the failures of the justice
system post-Katrina, noting that "[i]n the event of a major disaster, public
authorities must continue to process those accused or convicted of misdemeanors
in a prompt and orderly manner consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution. Where such processing is rendered impracticable commutation
should be the preferred response."27 5

266. Id. at 785-86.
267. Id. at 786 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 701(E) (2007); Kimbrough v. Cooper,
915 So. 2d 344 (La. 2007) (per curiam)).
268. AM. BAR ASS'N, RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF MAJOR DISASTER 1 (2007), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/disaster/docs/rol-in times of disasters.auth

checkdam.pdf.
269. Id. at 2. The ABA specifically referenced the collapse of the justice system following
Katrina as one of the reasons the ROL Principles were created. Id.
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id.
272. Id.

273. Id. at 5.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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C. InternationalLaw and the Right to Return

In the years after Katrina, the displacement of people from New Orleans has
resulted in what many called the "Katrina Diaspora."2 76 The true numbers of
people displaced from the Gulf Coast is unknown.277 Yet as Professor Waysdorf
noted, despite the hundreds of thousands evacuated by numerous agencies, no
agency has tracked the subsequent relocation, placement, or welfare of the
former residents. 278
An intriguing point of international law has bearing on the status and
protections afforded to those displaced by disaster. Often times, people such as
those who fled the Gulf Coast due to Katrina and Rita are termed refugees, yet
many object to that label for good reason: under international law, people
displaced by natural and other disasters are properly considered internally
displacedpersons (IDPs).279 According to Professor Frederick Kirgis:
No specific international convention (treaty) protects the rights of
persons displaced within their own national borders by natural disasters
or other causes. Nevertheless, as individuals who have not left their own
country, they remain entitled to the full range of human rights that are
280
applicable to the citizens of that country.
The Guiding Principles of Internally Displaced Persons281 (Guiding
Principles) were submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
in 1998, and while they have not been established by treaty, the United Nations
General Assembly has stated that the Guiding Principles are an important
framework for the protection of IDPs.282 As Professor Kirgis described them,
"[t]he Guiding Principles cover all three phases of displacement, namely

276. See Susan L. Waysdorf, Returning to New Orleans: Reflections on the Post-Katrina
Recovery, DisasterRelief and the Strugglefor Social Justice, 12 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 3, 12 (2009)
(citing Rick Jervis & Brad Heath, FEMA Spends Nearly $3B to House Hurricane Victims, USA
TODAY, Aug. 26, 2008, at lA).
277. The 2008 population of New Orleans was at 72% of its pre-Katrina populace of 450,000.
See Rick Jervis, New Orleans' Population May Have Hit Plateau, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2008,
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-08-04-neworleansN.htm. Two years later, the
population was still 29% less than it was before Katrina. See ALLISON PLYER & ELAINE ORTIZ,
GREATER NEW ORLEANS CMTY. DATA CTR., THE NEW ORLEANS INDEX AT SIX: MEASURING
GREATER NEW ORLEANS' PROGRESS TOWARD PROSPERITY 6 (Aug. 2011).
278. Waysdorf, supra note 276, at 35.
279. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Hurricane Katrina and Internally Displaced Persons, ASIL
INSIGHTS, Sept. 21, 2005, at para. 1, available at http://www.asil.org/insights050921.cfin.
280. Id. at para. 4.
281. Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles],
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G98/104/93/PDF/G9810493.pdf?
OpenElement.
282. Kirgis, supra note 279, at para. 8.
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protection against displacement, protection during displacement, and the postdisplacement phase." 2 3 Kirgis also explained that, during these phases, the main
duty to ensure the protection of IDPs falls on national authorities, not
international authorities.284
The Guiding Principles define IDPs as persons who were forced to flee their
homes or dwellings to avoid armed conflict, natural disasters, or man-made
disasters, and who have not crossed an international boundary.285 Under the
Guiding Principles, IDPs have a right to return: the relevant authorities have the
duty and responsibility to establish conditions and means to allow IDPs to
"return voluntarily, in safety and with dignity" to their homes or to allow them to
resettle in another part of the country.
IDPs are also entitled to housing,
education, and medical services, including mental health and social services. 287
The Guiding Principles' recognition of an IDP's "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his or her residence," and "right to seek safety
in another part of the country," 288 parallels the right to freedom of travel 289 -a
due process guarantee of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments recognized by
the Supreme Court. 29 0 The proposition that "the right to flee from a hazardous
disaster area is not just implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, it is essential to
human dignity"291 was clearly evidenced after Katrina.29
When people
attempted to cross the Crescent City Connection Bridge-connecting New
Orleans to the neighboring Gretna-they were met with barricades and armed
law enforcement officers who demanded that they return to New Orleans. 293 The
right to flee argument has not fared well in the courts, however, as several
lawsuits filed relating to the blockage of the bridge were dismissed for various
reasons, including: (1) finding that the Constitution does not guarantee a right to
intrastate travel; (2) finding that the City of Gretna-the nearest city adjacent

283. Id. atpara. 11.
284. Id In comparison to IDPs, someone classified as a refugee (aperson who fled across a
border because of persecution) can draw upon an established international system of protection and
aid.

See Roberta Cohen, Time for the United States to Honor International Standards in

Emergencies, BROOKINGS (Sept. 9, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2005/09/
09hurricanekatrina-cohen.
285. Guiding Principles,supra note 281, at 5.

286. Id at 14.
287. Id at 11, 12.
288. Id. at 9-10.
289. See Rebecca Eaton, Comment, Escape Denied: The Gretna Bridge and the Government's
Armed Blockade in the Wake ofKatrina, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127, 163 (2006).

290. See Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1981) (citing Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270, 272 (1900)).
291. Eaton, supranote 289, at 173.
292. See id.
293. Carol Kopp, The Bridge to Gretna, 60 MINUTES

(Feb. 11,

2009, 6:55 PM),

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/15/60minutes/main1 129440.shtml.
294. See Dickerson v. City of Gretna, No. 05-6667, 2007 WL 1098787, at *1, *3 (E.D. La.
Mar. 30, 2007) (citing Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900, 901-02 (5th Cir. 1975)) (declining
to find a constitutional right of intrastate travel); see also Cantwell v. City of Gretna, No. 06-9243,

Published by Scholar Commons, 2013

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 5
498

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 465

to New Orleans in Jefferson Parish-had no food, water, or supplies to provide
to people who came to Gretna; 295 and (3) finding that there was a plausible
policy reason to forbid pedestrian traffic on a vehicles-only bridge, while
allowing vehicular traffic to pass without issue.296
While the Guiding Principles have not been officially adopted by the United
States Congress,297 doing so would provide additional protections of and respect
for the dignity of those displaced by disaster.298 Professor Waysdorf proposed
the same, suggesting that updating national legislation and disaster law to
include the Guiding Principles would reduce the impact, suffering, and trauma of
those affected by disaster.299 Adopting the Guiding Principles-or similar
guidelines that account for human rights-in the United States, or even similar
laws in individual states, would serve to decrease vulnerability by increasing the
ability of a population to recover from disaster.
D. Post-DisasterSocial Justice

Apart from the ideals of professionalism and the requirements of the ethical
rules, attorneys are well placed to ensure that, in the times following disasters,
social justice is carried out to protect society as a whole.300 The right to practice
law gives attorneys the ability to aid people in true need, including those affected
by disaster-particularly communities and groups that were already vulnerable
before a disaster occurred.
In his list of ten lessons from disasters, Professor Munneke included
"shar[ing] in community healing," noting that attorneys often take major
leadership roles in helping communities recover. 301 According to Munneke,
"Transactional business lawyers, whose clients are frequently the victims of the
same forces that harm lawyers, have a special obligation to serve these clients in

2007 WL 4256983, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 30 2007) (dismissing the cause of action regarding
intrastatetravel, but denying the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claims relating to interstate travel).
295. Alexander v. City of Gretna, No. 06-5405, 2008 WL 5111152, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 3,
2008) (granting summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' right to travel claims).
296. Id.
297. See Kirgis, supra note 279, at para. 8.
298. Waysdorf, supra note 276, at 37.
299. Id.
300. Professor Rodes defined socialjustice as:
[T]hat branch of the virtue of justice that moves us to use our best efforts to bring
about a more just ordering of society-one in which people's needs are more fully met. It
solves the problem of assignability because it is something due from everyone whose
efforts can make a difference to everyone whose needs are not met as things stand. I do
not owe the man on the grate a place to live, but I do owe him whatever I can do to
provide a social order in which housing is available to him. I do not owe any poor person
a share of my wealth, but I owe every poor person my best effort to reform the social
institutions by which I am enriched and he or she is impoverished.
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Social Justice andLiberation, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 619, 620-21 (1996).

301. Munneke, supra note 35, at 26 (stating that "lawyers play a major role in helping to heal
the community at large").
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times of crisis in order to restore these businesses to functionality and commerce
to the community at large." 302 As Professor Verchik asserted, a free society is
obligated to reduce risk to communities and relieve social vulnerability, and the
failure to provide such relief constitutes an injustice. 303 Social justice is also a
major concern underlying Professor Waysdorf's assertion that "we cannot allow
our inner cities to become such highly concentrated poverty areas, segregated by
race, and then be surprised when they are so vulnerable to disasters both natural
and man-made." 304
According to the ABA's Center on Children and the Law (the Center), 4,940
children-some of whom were in foster care-were initially reported as missing
or displaced.305 Of that group, 4,455 children were located.
According to
Siobhan Morrissey, "When children are missing from foster care-kids who
have been abused, neglected or abandoned-they are the most vulnerable."307
Working with the National Center for State Courts and the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the Center developed a project that sought to
"locate any children who were separated from their foster families during the
turmoil after Katrina, identify lawyers with expertise in child welfare who will
be available to volunteer their services following disasters, and assess the legal
issues that arise in the wake of widespread disasters."30 8
Other vulnerabilities were revealed when President George W. Bush
suspended the provisions of the Davis Bacon Act309-which governs pay for
workers on federal contracts, including contracts in areas affected by Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita-claiming that he suspended these provisions to hasten cleanup
and reconstruction.310 This decision led to exploitation and lack of legal
protections for illegal migrant workers who came to the Gulf Coast for work in
311
rebuilding.
Ultimately, civil rights organizations, such as the Southern
Poverty Law Center, filed suit on behalf of large groups of migrant workers,

302. Id. at 23. Munneke suggests that, by virtue of providing legal services instead of goods,
business law firms and attorneys are in a better position to help their clients overcome consequences
of a disaster because the firms are more flexible and portable. Id. at 23-24.
303. See Robert R.M. Verchick, DisasterJustice: The Geography of Human Capability,23

DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 23, 52 (2012).
304. Waysdorf, supranote 276, at 23.
305. Siobhan Morrissey, ABA Answers the Call: YLD and Other Association Entities Address
Legal Needs ofKatrina Victims, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2006, at 66, 66-67.

306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 66-67.
40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (2006) (original version at ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931)).

310. See Thomas B. Edsall, Bush Suspends PayAct In Areas Hit by Storm, WASH. POST, Sept.

9, 2005, at D03, available at 2005 WLNR 27761609.
311. See generally Haley E. Olam & Erin S. Stamper, Note, The Suspension of the Davis
Bacon Act and the ExploitationofMigrant Workers in the Wake ofHurricaneKatrina, 24 HOFSTRA

LAB. & EMP. L.J. 145 (2006) (explaining the effects of the Davis Bacon Act's suspension on local
and migrant workers).
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seeking payment for wages that were not paid in accordance with state and
federal laws.312
Some of the finest examples of professionalism and respect for justice
following Katrina and Rita came from law students, who created and operated
the Student Hurricane Network (SHN). 313 From December 2005 to early 2009,
over 5,500 law students traveled to the Gulf Coast, performing work that
included gutting homes and clearing rubble, interviewing incarcerated
defendants "who had slipped through the cracks and had been left in wait for
months to speak to a lawyer," and talking with FEMA trailer park residents and
inquiring what sort of aid they needed most.314 Professor Colbert heartily
praised the work of law students and the SHN post-Katrina, saying that they
"performed admirably and in the highest tradition of the legal profession," and
while they "knew little of a profession's ethical code or aspirational goals [t]hey
acted from a sense of what was right and morally necessary from members of a
'noble' profession." 3 15
But many times in the aftermath of a disaster, decisions about justice and the
question of what role an attorney plays become deeply personal. Glenn
McGovern-whose post-Katrina experiences were discussed above-found
himself faced with the critical decision many attorneys and firms must make
following a disaster: whether to stay and rebuild or leave.316 As he describes it:
Any lingering doubts about my decision to stay and rebuild were
removed when I received a phone call from a client who started crying
when she heard my voice. "I thought you were dead when I couldn't
reach you," she cried. "I am in Atlanta. I lost everything. My mom lost
her house. Can you still help us?" I choked up. "Sure," I said. "I'm
not leaving. Maybe later I will relocate but I will help you now. That's
what I'm here for." I had not fully realized others' need for me until
that moment.3 17
McGovern also received calls from his condominium association informing
him that twenty-five of the association's businesses had been lost in the

312. See Case Docket: Rodrigues et al. v. Belfor USA Group Inc., S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/rodrigues-et-al-v-belfor-usa-groupinc#.UdCxl nVCpc (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
313. The SHN was "a national network of law students dedicated to advancing the cause of
social justice in communities affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita by coordinating volunteer
efforts, aiding public interest organizations, and educating members of the legal community about
legal crises in the region." See About the Student Hurricane Network, STUDENT HURRICANE
NETWORK, http://www.studentjustice.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
314. SHN Dissolution Announcement, STUDENT

HURRICANE

NETWORK,

http://www.

studentjustice.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
315. Colbert, supranote 165, at 740.
316. McGovern, supra note 47, at 808.
317. Id.
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hurricane, the manager had resigned, the other owners had scattered, and nobody
had any idea where to start.
McGovern had experience as a building
contractor before going to law school and felt that he could help.319 He
recovered the flood proceeds for the condominium association; called a meeting
to vote to rebuild (with 80% of the owners voting "Yes"); negotiated a partial
settlement on wind and roof damage claims; obtained building costs and
estimates; found a bonded contractor; and obtained a building permit for the
property.320
Clearly, the legal profession often has equal successes and failures when
called on to aid those in need following disasters. To tilt this scale towards more
successes in the event of future disasters, the profession must first recognize that
it serves as a front line of defense in preventing injustice. Awareness of the risks
to the rule of law and the system of justice following large-scale disasters is
certainly part of this recognition. However, a greater emphasis on social justice
and ensuring that those displaced by disaster are guaranteed basic human rights
is also necessary. Attomeys who might not normally think their skills are useful
following a disaster should be encouraged to reassess their positions.
Recognizing that any attomey may be capable of providing legal services in an
emergency-not just when asked, but when a great need warrants assistance
without prompting-aids more than just those in need. Providing assistance
upholds the principles of civility and professionalism that guide the legal
profession.
VII. CONCLUSION

America is no longer just post-Katrina, Rita, and September 11. The United
States is now post-Hurricanes Ike, Gustav, and Sandy, post-Moore and Joplin
tomados, post-Boston Marathon bombing, post-Quebec oil train derailment and
explosion, and post-Yamell Hill and the loss of nineteen wildemess firefighters
there. Each time a disaster occurs, painful reminders of previous disasters are
brought to the forefront. Every time, questions arise regarding whether
preparation was sufficient and whether the capacity existed to prevent or
minimize damage, as well as what could have been done or what could be done
in anticipation of future disasters.
The kind of disaster an attorney may potentially face has no limits, whether
natural, technological, or otherwise. But the effects that a disaster can have on a
law practice can be contained-and such containment should result in
compliance with the Model Rules and a corresponding reduction in possible
malpractice suits based on negligence. Moreover, such preparation minimizes
the effects of a disaster on clients.

318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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Yet the broader question remains: what can attorneys do before or after a
disaster to ensure that the rule of law and the concept of justice are present and
protected? Are failures of the justice system-such as Katrina time and its
regrettable introduction into the legal lexicon-offset by the remarkable efforts
of the law students of the Student Hurricane Network? Are attorneys capable of
reaching past their own specialties to ensure access to justice for those most
affected by disaster? These questions may require a deeper individual analysis
and an application of one's own morals and values, coupled with respect for the
high principles that so many in the legal profession aspire to reach. Hopefully,
after finding an answer, members of the legal profession can take steps towards a
stronger sense of justice-so that, in the aftermath of a disaster, the harsh results
are minimized while the rule of law prevails.
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